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COURT PROCEDURE AND SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT
IN CASE OF THE CRIMINAL INSANE
Mary Goshom Williams and Mabel A. Elliott
Dr. Elliott Is Associate Professor of Sociology and Criminology at the University of Kansas. Mrs. Williams Is associated with her as a member of the

staff. Together they sent out over 300 letters to wardens and attorney generals
to secure the data that is analyzed in this article. Practice lags behind both
what we believe and what we demonstrate.-(Editor)

It is common knowledge that the significant advance in understanding mental disorders has not been markedly evidenced in
public provisions for the treatment of mental disease. In fact
most treatment has lagged far behind accepted principles and techniques for handling persons who are victims of mental deterioration and emotional disorders. This is true in the case of civilian
mental patients. For those mentally deranged persons who have
committed serious offenses, normally designated as crimes, the
problem of treatment is complicated, not merely by the generally
retarded standards of public institutions, but by the whole legal
philosophy as to what constitutes both crime and insanity. On
the one hand the offender is de facto guilty of criminal behavior,
of having committed an offense or a series of offenses which are
specifically forbidden by law. As such, he is liable to conviction
and sentence according to the law.
The law, on the other hand, has long since incorporated the principles of man's "responsibility" for his conduct, whether it be
acceptable or condemned, in accordance with the classical and
ecclesiastical philosophy out of which this theory grew.
Such ecclesiastical theory has held on a priori grounds that
man is a free, moral agent, one who makes a free choice
in his decision to do right or wrong. On the other hand,
men of unsound mind (non compos mentis) have long since
been recognized as incompetent to make such decisions; hence, by
strictest application of legal philosophy, the mentally deranged
who have committed crimes have been adjudged "irresponsible
because insane." On such grounds many cases of persons suffering from violent mental disturbances have been allowed to go
scot-free after the commission of what would otherwise have been
adjudged a serious offense. Earlier such persons were acquitted as
"not guilty," with no adequate provision for the protection of
society against the further damages of similar outbreaks of violence.
That persons may become so mentally or emotionally disturbed
as to be incapable of normal reasoning is thus generally recognized. The criteria employed to establish the irresponsible character of an individual's behavior vary, however, from the most
scientific techniques of those skilled in psychology and psychiatry
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to the simple testimony of untutored laymen. Because of the comparative recency of the scientific development of psychiatry and
psychology and the more or less esoteric jargon employed in these
sciences, only that part of the public which has received some
training in these subjects is capable of understanding psychiatric
or psychological testimony offered in defense of the emotionally
disturbed or mentally ill. In consequence, the legal profession has
been prone to reject psychiatric testimony as illogical or unreasonable. Furthermore, law has its roots in age-old customs, not in
the acceptance of modern theories as to the dynamic character of
human behavior. Moreover, legal decisions have been built, upon
the complicated system of precedent. Prior verdicts are accepted
as true and proper methods for disposing of contemporary problems. So it is that the legal profession today tends to define responsible conduct in terms of the McNaugthen-Drummond Case
of 1843, in which the basis for deciding upon a man's sanity was
established by the famous "right and wrong test." According to
the decision in this case a man was sane if he knew the difference
between right and wrong, insane if he did not.
Previous to this case, the best judicial opinion had held that
all criminals should be subject to the full penalty of the law unless
they were not conscious of the nature of their act, or possessed
no more reasoning capacity than "a wild beast or an infant." The
McNaughten-Drummond Case, tried in the British Courts in
1843,1 produced a modification of this practice. In this particular
case, the defendant's guilt was clear but he was quite obviously
insane, and was for this reason acquitted by the jury. The House
of Lords so disapproved of the decision, however, that they requested a group of judges to define and clarify the right and
wrong test. The judges in turn formulated a series of questions
to be put to the defendant pleading insanity to determine whether
he, in committing the crime, knew he was doing wrong.
In general outlines this so-called right and wrong test has persisted and forms an important part of the proceedings in the case
of alleged insanity of the defendant in most criminal trials in the
United States. In the course of time the test has been expanded
to iliclude a knowledge of consequences in certain jurisdictions, but
just as often it stands as defined above. More recently judges have
broadened their interpretation of this test and have held the accused is not responsible if his act is the "offspring or product of
2
mental disease."
The conclusions of modern psychiatry and psychology are so
widely accepted by recently trained college graduates that the
'Sheldon Glueck, Mcntal Disordcr and the Criminal Law. Little, Brown
and Company, Boston, 1925, pp. 161-186, and p. 368, for a discussion of this case.
3Ibid., pp. 187-229.
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validity of the right and wrong test for measuring normal mental
functioning no longer can be held by educated men and women. Compulsive behavior is, perhaps, the best example of such inadequacy.
For example we may find a man to be intellectually aware of the
nature of his behavior, to know that his conduct is "wrong," so
to speak; yet a compulsion impels him to behave in a particular
manner. Thus, a man may know it is wrong to kill another man,
but be unable to resist the impulse to kill. He may be convinced
that, irrespective of the immoral nature of murder, he must kill.
Or he may be so emotionally wrought up that he virtually explodes, despite any otherwise rational attitudes he may have on
the sanctity of human life.
Both popular opinion and the law, on the other hand, attach
far less stigma to being adjudged "irresponsible" because of
insanity than they do to serving a sentence because of conviction
for the offense. It is not surprising therefore that there has been
a strong impetus to abuse the plea of "not guilty because of
insanity." Such pleas have been particularly frequent in case of
defendants indicted for murder. The extent to which such a plea
has been abused cannot be accurately determined, but in any
event, the public mind has come to regard the plea as a means
of escaping the rightful consequences of criminal behavior, in
other words, a legal subterfuge. Part of this public reaction is
derived from the customary practice of having the defendant
produce alienists to testify as to the nature of his mental condition. Since the defendant or someone interested in him must
pay the fee of such a specialist, the practice tends to be discredited on the grounds that the alienist is paid to help the
defendant and not to give an honest opinion. To a degree this
opinion is substantiated by the disparity in opinion between the
alienists who testify for the State and those testifying for the
defendant.
In order to minimize any tendency to give false testimony
for a fee it would seem to be a far better procedure for the state
to create a psychiatric board consisting of at least three members. These men should receive a stipulated sum for their services so as to preclude any basis for assuming that their testimony
might be colored by financial considerations.
Under existing practices there undoubtedly have been many
cases in which the plea, insanity, was made in an effort to avert
conviction. To offset this, outraged legislators have enacted new
laws providing for the incarceration of such persons under the
special classification of "criminally insane." Instead of adhering
to the old policy of adjudging such persons not guilty because
insane, legal provision for another verdict arose, viz.: not guilty,
but insane. Practices in the various states have depended quite
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naturally upon the legislation enacted in such instances, as well
as upon the folkways of local prisons and courts, all these developing with little or no actual statutory provision. Those of us
familiar with treatment of the criminal insane in our own communities ordinarily can express only chagrin for the local practices.
Since there have been no studies indicating exactly what procedures are employed in dealing with those defendants alleging
insanity and those adjudged criminal insane in the United
States, we have undertaken the problem of ascertaining procedures for dealing with these situations in the various states.
Letters requesting such information were sent out to all the state
prison wardens and to all state attorney generals. Approximately one-half answered the first request, one-fourth (one-half of
the remaining group) the second request, and information was
obtained from practically all through the third letter. All told,
47 attorney generals or states attorneys and 48 wardens3 re4
ported the practices in their particular states.
The need for clarification of our criminal procedure in case
of alleged insanity of persons under trial has long been obvious
to the criminologist and psychiatrist. Our research makes this
fact doubly patent, since the prevailing practices are obviously
confusing, and inconsistent. Upon analysis the returns from the
various states attorneys indicate that the basis for determining
sanity of the defendant in criminal cases fall into five distinct
classifications. 5 (1) In certain states an ordinary jury trial is
held for determining the sanity of the defendant, according to
the classical test of whether the defendant knows right from
wrong. Further inquiry with reference to the practices in these
states however discloses that the testimony of laymen and
experts is given as a means of determining the defendant's
mental condition. In effect the procedure in such states does not
vary markedly from (2) those states which employ a jury trial
and make the decision as to the sanity of the defendant on basis
of general evidence of competent laymen, or "expert testimony"
from practicing physicians. Expert testimony is permitted but
not required in this group of states. (3) In the third group of
states a jury decides as to the mental condition of the defendant
upon the evidence presented by expert testimony alone. (4) A
'Two letters received were scarcely literate, which In themselves were a
commentary on penal administration and practices.
'These data have been classified to the best of our ability. In case of any
apparent inconsistency of the states attorneys the
checked and rechecked. The authors have accepted
attorney generals except where there seemed to be
checking with bibliographical and other sources.
'We are accepting the data received from the states
states as authentic with reference to the practices of

information has been
the statements of the
important reasons for
attorneys of the several
the particular states.
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fourth group has abolished the jury trial, and the testimony of
physicians alone determines whether or not the defendant is
declared insane. (5) Certain states (including some which require a jury trial and others which do not) stipulate that the
expert testimony must be given by a physician who is a specialist in mental disease. (6) In two states no general procedure is
required.
If we examine each of these classifications in detail we find
that in group I, the right and wrong test is the theoretical basis
for the jury's decision in case of alleged insanity of the defendant in 14 states, viz: Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, South Dakota,
Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. This test is however offset by the general practice of requiring competent laymen
and/or physicians to testify in these states. In no case, however,
is the expert necessarily a specialist in mental disease although
he may occasionally be such.
Texas and several other states require expert testimony, but
it need not be that of psychiatrists. In Illinois the classical right
and wrong test still prevails despite the recently enacted (1943)
Mental Health Act. If so desired either the state or the defendant
may introduce expert testimony, but generally speaking testimony
is given by persons who knew the defendant on or about the day
6
the crime was committed.
In Iowa the trial for determining the sanity of a defendant
proceeds on the same basis as for any other trial, but the burden
of the proof is upon the defendant. If it is determined that the
defendant is insane he can not be indicted "until his reason is
restored," in which event he may be returned to the custody of
the court for trial. In the event that a misdemeanant incarcerated in an Iowa jail becomes insane, he however may be tried
before a commission of insanity rather than a regular jury. In
this case the medical opinion of a reputable practising physician
is required. The commission of insanity in each county is composed of three members, viz., the clerk of the district court, a
reputable physician, and a reputable attorney. It seems obvious
that persons guilty of minor offenses in Iowa are thus more
likely to receive intelligent disposition than in case of those
indicted for felonious offenses.
However, the prevailing practice in all states in group I fails
to recognize the incompetency of many general practitioners to
testify with reference to mental disease. It stands true that most
older medical men engaged in general practice have had very
little if any training in abnormal psychology or mental disorders.
Jerome Finkle, Executive Secretary of the Legislative Reference Bureau,
Springfield, Illinois. Correspondence, dated April 20, 1944.
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In only a few of our medical schools is specialization in mental
disease possible, hence medical schools must bear part of the
blame for the general lack of suitable standards. We do not
actually have enough psychiatrists to give competent testimony
with reference to what constitutes insanity. In groups II and III
the final decision as to the sanity of the defendant also depends
upon a jury of laymen. Group II, which includes Alabama, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New Haimpshire, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania includes roughly those states which
allow either general evidence upon the part of laymen or expert
testimony or both. Of this group Alabama also employs the
right and wrong test. As a matter of fact, notions of right and
wrong undoubtedly color the layman's conception of the nature
of insanity. If in popular parlance a man is "out of his head"
the public is willing to concede that his conduct is unaccountable.
Of the states in this group Pennsylvania allows a most interesting procedure. Whenever in the course of the trial the judge
believes a defendant is a mental case he may stay the trial and
have the defendant examined.
The ten states which provide for jury trial and admit expert
evidence only, constitute group IV. These are Indiana, Florida,
Utah, Minnesota, California, Maine, Tennessee, Virginia, Michigan and Colorado. Two of these states, Virginia and Colorado,
also authorize waiving of jury trial, unless demanded. Kansas
which may have a jury trial with both general and expert evidence also permits a decision without a jury in case of expert
evidence. So also does Maryland, which may also employ the
right and wrong test with a jury trial. In addition to these four
states which may employ the non-jury trial permissively, twelve
other states-Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, Vermont, and Washington, authorize a
non-jury trial with only expert evidence in all such cases.
Patently this is an improvement over the jury decision, but not
all physicians are competent to decide such questions, as we have
said before.
In only six states, viz., New York, South Carolina, California,
Massachusetts, Arkansas and Rhode Island (group V) is the
expert required to be a specialist in mental disease. In Oregon
and Nebraska (group VI) there is apparently no fixed rule of
procedure but in practice Nebraska tends to fall in group II, with
a jury trial determining the sanity on the basis of evidence from
laymen or from reputable physicians.
To recapitulate briefly, 33 states still continue to decide cases
involving the plea of insanity on the basis of a jury trial, despite
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the subtle and intricate professional knowledge necessary to
diagnose many types of mental disorder. We should not consider
such a jury competent to diagnose pneumonia, yet a jury would
probably be a more reliable judge of physical disorder than for
the vagaries of mental disease.
So much for court procedure in reference to insanity. The
disposition of the convicted cases of criminal insane presents no
pleasanter picture, for in the case of criminals who are convicted
but adjudged insane, five different practices apply. Twenty-eight
states (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming) commit such criminals to a state hospital for the
insane. This would appear to be the most enlightened practice
in vogue. This practice is, however, often opposed by laymen,
and especially by the relatives of the non-criminal inmates, who
attach great stigma to "the association of their relatives with
murderers." Yet it is well recognized that many non-criminal
mental cases have made threat of violence and some, although
they have not been tried for a criminal offense, have actually
committed dangerous acts. Prominent families thus sometimes
succeed in committing their relatives to a mental hospital to
avoid a criminal trial. The difference between criminal and noncriminal conduct of insane persons tends thus to be a matter of
court decision rather than one of an actual difference in overt
behavior.
Nevertheless the objection to housing criminal insane with
the non-criminal insane has been loudly voiced in many states.
Twelve states (California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and West Virginia) have provided special
hospitals for the criminal insane. In the majority of these states
there is a relatively large insane population; hence, the mere
number of the criminal insane may warrant the existence of
such a separate institution.
Unfortunately, 4 states (Iowa, New Jersey, Washington, and
Wisconsin) still retain the barbaric custom of incarcerating the
criminal insane within the prison itself. In 2 states (Colorado
and Nevada) certain cases are kept in prison and others are sent
to the state hospital. In one state (Indiana) some prisoners are
confined in the prison, others are in a special hospital.
While hospitalization of the criminal insane is obviously to be
desired, there can be no assumption that all persons so hospitalized are receiving anything resembling adequate treatment. Any-
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one familiar with the overcrowded, under-staffed public hospitals
for mental cases knows how far we must go before we can meet
suitable standards in the case of the non-criminal mental
patients. In many mental hospitals deplorable conditions exist
because the insufficient appropriations will not provide for adequate medical staff, for trained attendants or suitable equipment.
Frequently, political considerations determine the appointments
of the assistants.
Meanwhile the plight of the convict who becomes a mental
case following his commitment is often more serious than that
of a person convicted as guilty but insane. Since less public
attention is focused on inmates than on persons on trial for
felonious offenses, inmates tend to be lost in institutional oblivion. Psychiatrists, themselves, have given relatively little attention to mental disorders arising in prisons, although it is
acknowledged that many cases of psychosis arise during the
period of incarceration. The sense of stigma, the isolation from
friends and loved ones, the tendency toward rationalization on
the part of the prisoners are a few of the factors which promote
mental disturbances.
What happens in many of these cases is a deplorable chapter
in the horrors of modern prison life. Few prisons have psychiatrists who are full-time members of their staffs, and visits
from outside or consulting psychiatrists are infrequent, if they
occur at all. If the warden and the medical staff are intelligently
aware of the serious nature of mental disturbance such cases
may be transferred eventually to a suitable hospital. But in far
too many instances the mentally ill prisoners live a vegetative
existence with little or no attention given to their unhappy
plight.
In light of all these facts the need for promoting a standard
law prescribing suitable procedure for determining the mental
condition of defendants alleging insanity seems apparent. Similarly there is grave need for improving the treatment of the
criminal insane. The American Law Institute and other interested groups would do well to accept this challenge.

